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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-ATTORNEY'S LIENS--
"MONEY" AND THE CHARGlNG LIEN 
703 
Attorneys in Nebraska are aided in collecting compensation 
for their services by the attorney's lien statute.1 The object of 
the lien statute is to protect the attorney against bad faith and in-
gratitude by clients, as well as collusion between a client and the 
adverse party which operates to deprive the attorney of his just 
compensation.2 It is the purpose of this article to expose some 
of the difficulties inherent in the application of the statute, study 
the arguments which support the various interpretations there-
of, and proffer recommendations for the correction and ampli-
fication of the statute. 
The attorney's lien statute has not been changed since it 
first appeared in the statutes in 1866.3 According to the Ne-
braska Supreme Court it is declaratory of the common law.4 
However, the statute apparently replaced the common law attor-
ney's lien, and the attorney does not have a lien for his services 
unless he strictly complies with the provisions of the statute." 
1 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-108 (Reissue 1954) provides: "An attorney has 
a lien for a general balance of compensation upon any papers of his client 
which have come into his possession in the course of his professional 
employment; and upon money in his hands belonging to his client, and 
in the hands of the adverse party in an action or proceeding in which 
the attorney was employed from the time of giving notice of the lien to 
that party." 
2 Myers v. Miller, 134 Neb. 824, 279 N.W. 778 (1938); Griggs v. 
Chicago R. I. & P. Ry .. 104 Neb. 301, 177 N.W. 185 (1920); Zentmire 
v. Brailey, 89 Neb. 158, 130 N.W. 1047 (1911); Jones v. Duff Grain Co., 
69 Neb. 91, 95 N.W. 1 (1903). 
3 The statute in its present form first appeared in Rev. Stat. Neb. 
Territory c. 3, § 8 (1866). See Marshall v. Casteel, 143 Neb. 68, 76, 11 
N.W.2d 818, 820 (1943). 
4 Zentmire v. Brailey, 89 Neb. 158, 130 N.W. 1047 (1911); Cones v. 
Brooks, 60 Neb. 698, 84 N.W. 85 (1900); Sayre v. Thompson, 18 Neb. 
33, 24 N.W. 383 (1885). 
5Young v. Card, 145 Neb. 857, 18 N.W.2d 302 (1945); Marshall v. 
Casteel, 143 Neb. 68, 8 N.W.2d 690, rehearing denied, 11 N.W.2d 818 
(1943); Card v. George, 140 Neb. 426, 299 N.W. 487 (1941); Vanderlip 
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The statute provides attorneys with the right to assert two 
types of liens: {a) Possessory liens and (b) Charging liens. 
The possessory lien is a lien on papers which belong to the 
client but are in the hands of the attorney. The lien does not 
give the attorney the right to convert the papers, but it does give 
him the power to hold the papers until he has been reimbursed 
for his services.6 If the attorney retains anything of value, the 
lien is an effective device to secure payment because it strengthens 
his bargaining position with a client who might otherwise lose 
interest in securing an immediate settlement of his obligation 
to the attorney. 
The statutory language from which the charging lien arises 
is not so definite as that of the possessory lien and thus raises 
many more problems. One of the major problems is determin-
ing the objects to which the lien attaches; more specifically, 
whether it can be interpreted to attach to real property. 
I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION BY THE NEBRASKA COURTS 
The statute provides only that an attorney has a lien on 
"money in the hands of the adverse party" from the time the 
attorney gives notice of the lien. Thus, any item to be subject 
to the lien must fall within the confines of the word "money." 
On initial inspection of the statute, one would assume since the 
term "money" is used, that the attorney could obtain a lien only 
upon the property of a monetary nature. However, a study of 
three important Nebraska cases shows that the lien attaches to 
property other than legal currency and coins. 
The first clear pronouncement by the Supreme Court of Ne-
braska that the lien did attach to something more than currency 
was in the case of zentmire v. Brailey.1 In that case the attor-
ney was employed by a real estate agent to collect the agent's 
fee for the sale of land. An action was filed for the fee, and later 
an attachment was made against some of the defendant's real 
property. The attorney filed notice of his lien. Fifteen days 
later the plaintiff and the defendant, without knowledge of the 
attorney, secured a dismissal of the action. The defendant im-
v. Barnes, 101 Neb. 573, 163 N.W. 856 (1917); Rice & Gorum v. Day. 
33 Neb. 204, 49 N.W. 1128 (1891); Elliott v. Atkins, 26 Neb. 403, 42 
N.W. 403 (1889); Lavender v. Atkins, 20 Neb. 206, 29 N.W. 467 (1886). 
o State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass'n v. Bachelor, 139 Neb. 253, 297 
N.W. 138 (1941); Van Etten v. State, 24 Neb. 734, 40 N.W. 289 (1888). 
i 89 Neb. 158, 130 N.W. 1047 (1911). 
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mediately conveyed the attached property to his father-in-law. 
Three days later the attofoey secured an order vacating the dis-
missal of the case and reinstating the attachment. The grantee 
of the property then brought an action to prevent the enforce-
ment of the attorney's lien. The supreme court held that the lien 
was still in effect on the attached property. The court reasoned: 
The legal effect of the attachment was to bring •.. [the defendant] 
into court and to charge the property with a lien in favor of . . . 
[the original plaintiff] for satisfaction of his claim. The attorney's 
lien was filed in the case and bound the property itself.s (Italics 
ours) 
The case illustrates that the lien may attach to real property 
as well as currency. The case does not answer satisfactorily the 
question of whether transfer to a bona fide purchaser e:l'..'iinguishes 
the lien.9 
The case, however, seemed to lose some of its vitality by 
the decision of the supreme court in the case of Marshall 1.J. 
Casteel.10 In that case the attorney for the plaintiff filed notice 
of his lien in a foreclosure action. The plaintiff bought the prop-
erty at the sale. Years later, after the statute of limitations had 
run on the attorneY's lien, a subsequent purchaser was successful 
in quieting title to the property. The defendant in the quiet 
title action was the attorney of the plaintiff in the foreclosure 
action. In its first opinion the supreme court held that the stat-
ute gave a lien upon "money" in the hands of the adverse party 
and did not give a lien on real property. On rehearing the court 
held that in the foreclosure action title to the property at the 
sale passed to the purchaser free of the attorney's lien even 
though the purchaser was the attorney's client. Judge Paine 
in a lengthy concurring opinion11 discussed the validity of the at-
torney's lien in Nebraska. In justifying the opinion of the court 
he distinguished the zentmire case by saying: 
It is quite clear that Judge Rose in this opinion [in the zentndre 
case] held that the attorney's lien was enforceable against the 
attached land, not because it was a lien on the land, but because 
it was a lien on the attachment, and only because of that fact, 
s Id. at 162, 130 N.W. at 1049. 
9 It is noted here that the third person was the father-in-law of the 
defendant. He was not regarded as a bona fide purchaser. Cf. Marshall 
v. Casteel, discussed infra, in which the attorney was unsuccessful in 
asserting his lien against a subsequent purchaser from the purchaser at 
the foreclosure sale. 
io 143 Neb. 68, 8 N.W.2d 690, rehearing denied, 11 N.W.2d 818 (1943). 
11 Id. at 72, 11 N.W.2d at 818. 
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and in that particular case, it was in effect a lien on the land, 
for while the attached property was not a judgment. it was a lien 
obtained through court process.12 
Judge Paine then said that the lien in the Casteel case was 
filed against the decree of foreclosure and did not attach to the 
land itself. 
While the zentmire case was distinguished from the Casteel 
case on the basis that the lien in the zentmire case attached not 
to the property but to the judgment, such a distinction is not 
consistent with the language of the case,13 the wording of the 
statute, or the general conception of the nature of a lien. 
In the recent case of Tuttle v. WymanH the supreme court 
defined "money" in its broadest terms when it held that the 
lien attached to the property rather than to a judgment or at-
tachment. In that case the plaintiff-client entered into a con-
tract with the attorney which provided that the attorney was to 
be paid out of the funds recovered in the action. The plaintiff 
was successful in the district court, and the defendant appealed. 
Before the appeal was taken, the plaintiff and defendant secured 
a dismissal of the action. The supreme court granted an at-
torney's lien on the funds and real property in the trust which 
was still in the hands of the defendant. The court set out the 
following definition of "money" : 
In a specific sense, the rents and profits here involved were money 
in the hands of the adverse party. On the other hand, the statute 
giving an attorney a lien on money in the hands of the adverse 
party must be liberally construed . . . . The word "money" is 
used not only in a specific but also in a comprehensive and general 
sense, and when so used, as we do here, and in similar cases 
where money or property or both are recovered by a judgment 
or its equivalent process of the court, then the word "means 
wealth representative of commodities of all kinds, of lands, and 
of everything that can be transferred in commerce" for satisfac-
tion of a claim so established in litigation.15 
Thus, this case suggests that the court might permit an at-
torney's lien to attach to real property, provided the property 
were the subject matter of the judgment and the case involved a 
suit by the attorney to enforce his lien upon the property while 
it was still held by the parties to the action. If an attorney's 
12 Id. at 78, 11 N.W.2d at 821. 
13 See note 8 supra. 
14149 Neb. 769, 32 N.W.2d 742 (1948). 
lti Id. at 780, 32 N.W.2d at 749. 
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lien is allowed on the res of a trust16 which involves real property 
-the situation in the Wyman case-then it seems that a lien 
should be allowed on real property. 
In summary, since the Nebraska court has never squarely 
held that an attorney cannot have a lien upon real property, and 
notwithstanding dicta that the attorney cannot have a lien on real 
property,17 it would appear that the Nebraska cases hold that 
real property is within the definition of the term "money" and 
thus subject to an attorney lien. 
Additional factors which aid the solution of the question at 
hand are policy considerations and the law in other jurisdictions. 
The applicability and value of these factors will be considered 
next. 
II. ADDITIONAL FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION 
There seems to be no point in distinguishing between the 
fruits of an attorney's labor involved in the recovery of real 
property, currency, or some other type of property.18 The ar-
gument that it is against public policy to burden real property with 
a lien because it lessens property values and causes hardships on 
subsequent purchasers19 dissipates when it is considered that as 
a practical matter there are many other charges attaching to 
property which place a purchaser on notice. 
The distinction, as used in the Casteel case, that the lien 
attaches to judgments and not to property seems to be against 
the plain meaning of the statute. It is unrealistic to say a lien 
attaches to a judgment unless all that is meant is that the lien 
16 Cf. In re Linch's Estate, 139 Neb. 761, 98 N.W. 697 (1941) where 
the attorney was allowed a fee for preserving a trust res and was given 
a lien from the time he filed notice. However, it appeared that there 
was sufficient money to satisfy the lien. 
17 Three Nebraska cases cite the proposition that an attorney's lien 
cannot attach to real property. These cases did not contain fact situations 
that warranted the making of that statement. See Young v. Card, 145 
Neb. 857, 18 N.W.2d 302 (1945); Marshall v. Casteel, 143 Neb. 68, 8 
N.W.2d 690, rehearing denied, 11 N.W.2d 818 (1943); Card v. George. 
140 Neb. 426, 299 N.W. 487 (1941). 
1srn Taylor v. Stull, 79 Neb. 295, 112 N.W. 577 (1907) a judgment 
awarded a prosecutrix in a bastardy proceeding was held to be subject 
to an attorney's lien, but such lien was held not to apply to potential 
money that would be due in a divorce action, though there was a state-
ment to the effect that if temporary compensation had been awarded the 
lien might have applied. See Yeiser Y. Lowe, 50 Neb. 310, 313, 69 N.W. 
847, 848 (1897). 
19 See Marshall v. Casteel, 143 Neb. 68, 80, 11 N.W.2d 818, 822 (1943). 
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attaches to the subject matter of the judgment.20 An additional 
indication that the lien attaches to the. property of the defendant 
and not the judgment is that the attorney can enforce his lien 
against the defendant even though the defendant, without notice 
to the attorney, has paid the plaintiff the complete obligation. 
In this situation the defendant has satisfied the judgment but is 
still liable for the amount of the lien.21 
Though it seems that under Nebraska's statute the lien is 
intended to attach to the subject matter of the judgment and 
not to the judgment itself, it is not a commonly accepted con-
clusion that "mo11ey" as used in that particular sense means 
wealth or property as was stated in the Wyman case.22 
It is significant to note that the Minnesota legislature con-
sidered the term so ambiguous that it changed the statute gov-
erning the charging lien of attorneys to include property and 
money instead of money only.23 In contrast, the Kansas statute 
20 Burleigh v. Palmer, 74 Neb. 122, 103 N.W. 1068 (1905), is typical 
of the Nebraska cases that speak in terms of the lien attaching to the 
judgment. By stating that the lien attaches to the judgment, the court 
seems to intend to limit the scope of the lien and not have it apply to 
all the money (and property) in the defendant's possession. It would 
seem that public policy demands this interpretation to be made, but it 
is not clear that the lien attaches to the judgment and not the subject 
matter of the judgment. See Marshall v. Casteel, 143 Neb. 68, 8 N.W.2d 
690, rehearing denied, 11 N.W.2d 818 (1943). 
21 Heinisch v. Travelers Mutual Cas. Co., 135 Neb. 13, 280 N.W. 234 
(1938); l\lyers v. Miller, 134 Neb. 824, 279 N.W. 778 (1938); Griggs 
v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. 104 Neb. 301, 177 N.W. 185 (1920); Gordon 
v. Hennings, 89 Neb. 252, 131 N.W. 228 (1911); Sayre v. Thompson, 
18 Neb. 33, 24 N.W. 383 U885). 
22 The first definition of money in the dictionary is that it is a type 
of currency. Funk-Wagnalls, New Standard Dictionary of the English 
Language (1947 ed.). But this dictionary gives four definitions of money. 
The first definition is that money is a standard of value and medium 
of payment established by law and includes notes or other tokens that are 
currently accepted in exchange for commodities. The second definition is 
that it is "salable possessions; wealth; property; as, making money." 
The other two definitions are that money means cash payment or a sys-
tem of coinage. It should be noted that within the second meaning of 
money the term wealth is qualified with an example such as "he has a 
lot of money,''-implying that the term means wealth only when used to 
signify riches, and by implication, one could argue that it doesn't mean 
wealth or property when used in a statute. In addition, Black's Law 
Dictionary states that usually "money" "does not embrace notes, bonds, 
evidences of debt, or other personal or real estate." 
23 The Minnesota legislature amended its attorney lien statute in 1939. 
See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 481.13 (1947); Akers v. Akers, 233 Minn. 133, 
140, 46 N.W.2d 87, 92 (1951) (held money was not property). 
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which reads the same as Nebraska's has been interpreted to mean 
that the lien does not attach to real propertyP 
The result is that the collateral factors split almost evenly 
on the question of whether real property should fall within the 
definition of the term "money" as used in the statute. However, 
in the light of the broad definition of "money" given by the court 
in the Wyman case, an attorney's lien can probably attach to 
real property which is the subject of the litigation if the at-
torney is diligent in enforcing his lien before innocent parties 
take the property. However, as long as the statute says "money," 
there is likely to be confusion concerning what is meant by the 
term. 
III. COURSES OF FUTURE ACTION 
Consequently, it seems that some legislative action should 
be taken. Two alternatives open to the legislature are to amend 
the lien statute to include both money and property, or to repeal 
the statute. 
There is some basis for arguing that the lien statute should 
be abolished. Apparently attorneys do not often invoke the aid 
of the statute.25 There might be some sentiment that filing a 
lien is resorting to a device beneath the dignity of the attorney. 
As a standard practice attorneys do not file notice of a lien with 
the cause of action. 
When deciding whether or not to file a lien during the course 
of the action, the attorney is faced with a dilemma. The best means 
of securing just compensation for his services is for the attorney 
to maintain the good will of his client. The best means of deal-
ing with the adverse party is to give him the impression that 
the attorney-client relationship is based on friendship and trust. 
The best means for the attorney to maintain a successful prac-
tice is to keep differences between himself and his clients at 
a minimum and not to give the impression to the court and the 
community . that he must resort to outside forces to gain com-
pensation. When the attorney serves notice that he intends to 
establish a lien, it might in the light of other circumstances in-
24 Kan. Gen. Stat. § 7-108 (1949). See Holmes v. Waymire, 73 Kan. 
104, 84 Pac. 558 (1906). 
25 No form is provided by Lightner, Nebraska Forms Annotated (2d ed. 
1951), for an attorney to file a lien in the original petition. However, 
in Vol. I, §§ 1506, 1507 forms are set out for filing the attorney's lien 
after the action has commenced. 
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dicate that relations between the attorney and his client have 
become strained. 
If the bar feels that the attorney's lien is an important 
aid to the attorney and its use should be encouraged, it could 
overcome the problem posed above by recommending that at-
torneys make it a standard practice to file notice of the attorney's 
lien with the cause of action. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the entire statute on attorney's liens 
should be revised and amplified.26 The principal objective of the 
revision should be to define more carefully the property to which 
the attorney's charging lien attaches. Also, the statute should 
define more carefully the types of actions to which it ap:plies, the 
proper method for giving notice of the lien to the adverse party 
and court, and a prescribed method for the attorney to enforce 
his lien. 
Robert Berskhire, '55 
26 The Nebraska State Bar Association accepted one recommendation to 
amend the present attorney's lien statute, but the legislature did not 
act upon the recommendation. See Report of Committee on Legislation, 
14 Neb. L.J. 65 (1933). The recommendation stated: "We recommend 
that § 7-108 ... relating to attorney's liens, be amended by adding there-
to the following . . . 'and upon any judgment against the adverse party, 
in an action in which the attorney was employed, and the proceeds of 
any such judgment from the date of entry of judgment in such action 
provided that such lien shall expire at the expiration of 9 0 days from 
the entry of final judgment unless within said time notice of such lien 
shall have been filed in the cause in which such judgment is entered.' " 
This amendment defines the lien in terms of proceeds of the judgment 
and provides a method for filing notice of the lien. It is submitted that 
a complete revision of the statute would be a more satisfactory solution 
to the problem. 
